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Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
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Docket Number USTR-2020-0011
Comments Regarding Proposed U.S.-Republic of Kenya Trade Agreement
We at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) are grateful for the opportunity to
provide input to the Office of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) with respect to a proposed
U.S.-Republic of Kenya (Kenya) trade agreement.
CCSI, a joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University,
focuses on international investment,  including related dispute resolution mechanisms, and the
impacts  such  investment  and  dispute  resolution  can  have  on  rights-compliant,  inclusive
sustainable development in the United States and abroad. 
Our comments focus primarily on investor-state arbitration, commonly referred to as investor-
state dispute settlement  or  ISDS. As explained below, ISDS should be abandoned as a failed
experiment of the past. It imposes costs on governance, democratic institutions, and taxpayers
that  are  not  offset  by  demonstrated  public  benefits.  Moreover,  its  increasingly  controversial
nature means that it can frustrate negotiations and ratification, threatening to stall progress on
other important aspects of a potential agreement. 
We also set forth  general principles to guide future elaboration of an investment chapter.
Investment  provisions should:  (1) strategically  support cross-border investment  that  produces
positive  development  outcomes  for  the  U.S.  and  Kenya,  (2)  facilitate  and  support  good
governance of investment projects, and (3) enhance cooperation to solve challenges associated
with cross-border investment that are not easily solved by any one country acting alone, such as
efforts  to combat  races to the bottom in terms of environmental,  labor,  and other regulatory
standards.
We thank you for your consideration of this submission.
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Comments Regarding Proposed U.S.-Republic of Kenya Trade Agreement
As the U.S. prepares to embark on negotiations with Kenya with the objective of concluding a
trade  agreement,  this  comment  will  specifically  focus  on  the  role  for  and  contours  of  any
potential investment provisions or chapter that may be included in any resulting treaty. 
The opportunity to provide input to this process is timely, as certain benefits to Kenya and other
African  states  currently  granted  under  the  African  Growth  and  Opportunities  Act  (AGOA),
absent Congressional action, will expire in 2025. Thus a trade agreement between the U.S. and
Kenya may take on additional importance in influencing and governing trade and investment
between the two states. USTR has indicated that its “vision is to conclude an agreement with
Kenya that can serve as a model for additional agreements in Africa, leading to a network of
agreements that contribute to Africa’s regional integration objectives. In addition, our goal is to
conclude an agreement that builds on the objectives of AGOA and will serve as an enduring
foundation to expand U.S.-Africa trade and investment across the continent.”1 Thus, while the
focus of this comment is on an agreement with Kenya, it is noted that the upcoming negotiation
and any agreement stemming from it may have greater systemic relevance and importance. 
I. Overall Objectives
Our comment focuses on two main themes. 
 Investor-state arbitration, commonly referred to as investor-state dispute settlement or
ISDS. As explained below, ISDS should be abandoned as a failed experiment of the past.
It imposes costs on governance, democratic institutions, and taxpayers that are not offset
by demonstrated public benefits. Moreover, its increasingly controversial nature means
that it can frustrate negotiations and ratification, threatening to stall progress on other
important aspects of a potential agreement. 
 General principles to guide future elaboration of an investment chapter.  Reflecting
guidance articulated by Congress in AGOA and other trade promotion legislation, as well
as certain existing policies advanced by U.S. agencies to support cross-border investment,
we  articulate  three  principles  that  should  guide  the  formulation  of  any  investment
provisions  or  chapter  with  Kenya,  and  illustrate  what  these  principles  can  mean  in
practice.  The three principles call on any agreement to (1) strategically support cross-
border investment that produces positive development outcomes for the U.S. and Kenya,
(2)  facilitate  and  support  good  governance  of  investment  projects,  and  (3)  enhance
cooperation  to  solve  challenges  associated  with  cross-border  investment  that  are  not
1 Letter from Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, dated March 17, 2020 < 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Kenya_FTA_Congressional_Notification_Letter-Pelosi.pdf>.
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easily solved by any one country acting alone, such as efforts to combat races to the
bottom in terms of environmental, labor, and other regulatory standards. 
II. A U.S.-Kenya Trade Agreement Should Not 
Include ISDS2
ISDS, which the U.S. began including in trade and investment treaties in (some form) the 1980s,
is now widely discredited. It exposes the U.S. and its treaty partners – and their taxpayers - to a
range of  potential  costs,  including costs  of  litigation  and liability,  and undue constraints  on
policy space. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that the costs of ISDS are offset by its hoped-
for  benefits  including,  in  particular,  increases  in  investment  flows  that  support  economic
development  of  the  treaty  parties,  or  improvement  in  the  quality  of  institutions  governing
investment.3 
Consistent  with  the  growing  awareness  of  ISDS’s  flaws  and  unmet  promises,  the  U.S.  has
substantially limited its scope in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). We
respectfully submit that the U.S. should reaffirm and even expand upon its modern and reasoned
rejection  of  ISDS  by  fully  eliminating  that  mechanism  from the  scope  of  any  U.S.-Kenya
agreement.4 In its place, each treaty party, alone and together, can provide international investors
and investments support through:
 efforts to ensure domestic institutions in the U.S. and Kenya are able to effectively offer
recourse and relief for government misconduct;
● adopting appropriate mechanisms for state-state consultation and dispute settlement; and
● providing  targeted  risk  insurance  or  other  market-based  mechanisms  calibrated  to
promote investment while also avoiding moral hazard and undue risks to taxpayers. 
Relying  on  these  dispute  settlement  options,  rather  than  ISDS,  will  result  in  meaningful
investment provisions that are consistent with U.S. negotiating objectives.5 
2 If the U.S. retains any form of ISDS, including in the USMCA form, improvements must be made. For a list of 
suggested improvements please see Annex A to this submission.
3 Other objectives cited by treaty parties include depoliticization of disputes and advancement of the rule of law. For
an overview of these objectives, and the lack of evidence showing that ISDS supports their achievement, see, e.g., 
Joachim Pohl, "Societal benefits and costs of International Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and 
available empirical evidence" (2018) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2018/01 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/e5f85c3d-en>; Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven and Jesse Coleman, “Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS Get Us There?” (2017) CCSI Blog Series 
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/12/11/investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-trying-to-achieve-does-isds-
get-us-there/>.
4 If ISDS is maintained, it will be important to consider limitations on who/what can bring claims, for what causes of
action, and for what remedies. Additional reforms are outlined in the Annex to this submission.  
5 19 U.S.C. § 4201(b)(4).
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This section outlines in more detail the costs of ISDS and questions about its ability to deliver
public benefits. 
A. Costs of ISDS to U.S. Interests and Objectives
1. Cost: Undue limits on policy space and harm to domestic 
institutions 
ISDS allows multinational enterprises to sue governments for conduct of any official or agency
in any branch of government;  ISDS enables foreign companies (or domestic  companies with
foreign  shareholders)  to  challenge  state  and  federal  action  and  inaction,  and  measures  or
decisions  taken  by  courts,  legislatures,  executive  officials,  and  administrative  officials  or
agencies. The scope of potential targets and range of measures that can be challenged is vast.
Good faith is not a defense; nor is the fact that the measure was permitted by or even required
under domestic statutes or the constitution. When the arbitration tribunals that decide these cases
find governments to have breached their treaty obligations, they commonly order the government
to pay the company claimants tens of millions of dollars, with awards not infrequently reaching
into the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. 
The fact that governments can be sued is not inherently problematic; indeed, it is essential for
government  accountability.  U.S.  law offers  many  tools  for  private  litigants  to  bring  claims
against the government for wrongful conduct and harm. But citizens, legislators, and judicial
decisionmakers strive to ensure substantive standards and procedural rules permitting those suits
are carefully calibrated to strike a proper balance between public and private rights and interests,
and ensure that the government has adequate flexibility to regulate in the public interest. That
calibration is an ongoing exercise,  evolving based on, among other things,  new insights and
information  about  the  effects  of  different  laws  and  policies;  new  challenges,  issues,  and
technologies; and changes in societal preferences and priorities. 
With ISDS, however, power of domestic individuals and institutions to establish (and continue to
examine and adjust) the proper role of government in society is shifted to arbitral tribunals.6 And
although Congress has directed negotiators to ensure that investment treaties do not grant foreign
investors greater substantive rights than otherwise available under U.S. domestic law,7 tribunals
are  not  effectively  controlled  by those  constraints.  When interpreting  treaty  language,  ISDS
tribunals are not bound by the intent of the parties to those treaties, or the U.S.’s desire to tether
the  international  standards  to  domestic  ones.  Indeed,  in  some  cases,  tribunals  have  shown
considerable willingness to demonstrate their freedom depart from the treaty parties’ expressed
positions.8 Moreover,  the awards  they issue are  enforceable  through international  treaties9 in
6 Id.
7 19 U.S.C. § 4201(b)(4).
8 See, e.g., cases discussed in Lise Johnson, New Weaknesses: Despite a Major Win, Arbitration Decisions in 2014
Increase the U.S.’s Future Exposure to Litigation and Liability (CCSI 2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/
Brief-on-US-cases-Jan-14.pdf.
9 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 UNTS 3 (the 
New York Convention); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, March 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (the
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processes that are designed to limit the role of domestic courts and the relevance of domestic law
and policy considerations.10 In his dissenting opinion in BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina,
Chief Justice John Roberts noted the extraordinary power held by arbitration tribunals to “review
[a state’s] public policies and effectively annul the authoritative acts of its legislature, executive,
and judiciary...a power it typically reserves to its own courts, if it grants it at all: the power to sit
in judgment on its sovereign acts.”11
Even though language in U.S. treaties may look similar to standards familiar in U.S. law, the
treaty provisions have been interpreted and applied to grant foreign investors greater protections
than domestic law offers, creating a situation whereby covered foreign investors and foreign-
owned businesses enjoy more extensive privileges than other individuals and entities in the U.S.
For  example,  though  language  on indirect  expropriation  in  modern  U.S.  investment  treaties
mirrors the Penn Central test the U.S. Supreme Court has developed to assess whether there has
been a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the way that the investment
treaty provision has been interpreted and applied is not tied to or limited by jurisprudence of U.S.
courts. Consequently, the line that ISDS tribunals draw between legitimate regulatory conduct
and expropriation requiring compensation can look considerably different – and less deferential
to governments’ regulatory powers – than the line drawn under U.S. law.12 
Similar comparisons could be made for other substantive standards included in U.S. investment 
treaties. The “fair and equitable treatment” standard, for example, is frequently interpreted and 
applied to condemn state behavior beyond the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment, and empowers ISDS tribunals to engage in Lochner-type judicial scrutiny of economic
regulations that have been largely discredited in the U.S. since the 1930s. Similarly, the non-
discrimination standards in U.S. treaties have been interpreted to go well beyond prohibitions on 
discrimination under U.S. law,13 and can entail more searching scrutiny of agency action, and 
order significantly different remedies, than would be permitted in U.S. courts.14 Thus, the ISDS 
mechanism gives rise to difficult and systemic challenges in terms of implementing a “no greater
Washington Convention).
10 See generally Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Jeffrey Sachs, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and 
U.S. Domestic Law” (May 2015) CCSI Policy Paper < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-
Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf>.
11 572 U.S. 25 (2014).
12 U.S. jurisprudence on indirect expropriation has developed in a way to be relatively protective of government
regulatory powers. Indirect or regulatory takings claims have a relatively low success rate. See, e.g., Carol Necole
Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas, Making or Breaking the Takings Claim,
102 Iowa Law Review 1847 (2017) (finding a 1.6% success rate for “Lucas-type” takings claims, in which the
government is alleged to have wiped out all economically beneficial or productive use of land); James E. Krier &
Stewart E. Sterk,  An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, William & Mary Law Review 35 (2016) (categorizing
different types of takings cases, finding low-success rates across the different categories (i.e., Lucas, Penn-Central,
exaction,  and  other),  albeit  with  some variations,  and  concluding  that  the  “courts  almost  always  defer  to  the
regulatory decisions made by government officials, resulting in an almost categorical rule that  Penn Central-type
regulatory actions do not amount to takings”);  Adam R. Pomeroy,  Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three-Part
Balancing Test or a One Strike Rule?,  22 Federal  Circuit Bar Journal 677, 692 (2013) (finding a roughly 12%
success  rate  for  cases  decided  on  the  merits;  the  success  rate  drops  to  4% when  considering  cases  that  were
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds).
13 Id.
14 Id. See also Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction
and Liability, March 17, 2015.
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rights” policy. This, in turn, places undue limits on domestic policy space and frustrates the role 
of domestic institutions in establishing and refining the legal norms that govern interactions 
between businesses, citizens, and the government. As Ambassador Lighthizer has stated:
We’ve had situations where real regulation which should be in place which is bipartisan, 
in everybody’s interest, has not been put in place because of fears of ISDS ... Why should
a foreign national be able to come in and not have the rights of Americans in the 
American court system but have more rights than Americans have in the American court 
system? It strikes me as something that at least we ought to be skeptical of and analyze. 
So a U.S. person goes into a court system, goes through the system and they’re stuck with
what they get. A foreign national can do that and then at the end of the day say ‘I want 
three guys in London to say we’re going to overrule the entire US system.’15
While this comment focuses on how ISDS produces and magnifies tensions between U.S. law
and international  investment  law under U.S. treaties,  it  is  also important  to note that  similar
concerns arise with respect to Kenya and other actual or potential treaty partners. When treaties
are concluded that give certain actors – namely covered foreign investors – a dispute settlement
mechanism and associated substantive protections that are removed from the domestic context
and exceed those available to other actors in the country, those treaties create inequalities in
terms of legal and political power. Those inequalities, in turn, can undermine the rule of law and
trust  in  domestic  institutions,  outcomes  that  are  contrary  to  and threaten  to  undermine  U.S.
support for and engagement with Kenya on broader governance and development initiatives.16
Other potential costs to the U.S. and its treaty counterparty, Kenya, include potentially crippling
compensation awards and excessive costs of arbitration. In terms of the size of awards, tribunals
have ordered governments sums that are shockingly disproportionate to both the amount of the
investors’ investment, and the ability of the host state to pay the award. In one recent dispute
against  Pakistan,  for  instance,  the  tribunal  awarded  the  investor  nearly  USD  6  billion  as
“compensation” for the government’s decision not to go ahead with a mining project that offered
the  country  questionable  domestic  benefits.   As  a  proportion  of  GDP,  the  award  would  be
comparable to a USD 410 billion award against the United States.17 
In terms of the costs of arbitration, an individual dispute, on average, now cost states more than
USD 5 million in legal fees and costs to defend; some vastly exceed that sum. Australia recently
spent  approximately USD 16 million defending itself  in a  claim brought  by Philip  Morris.18
Despite the tribunal’s finding of abuse of process on the part of the claimant, Philip Morris was
ordered to bear only 50% of the defense costs.19 This outcome is not uncommon - even when a
15 Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, Testimony before House Ways and Means Committee (March 21, 2018).
16 See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Nathan Lobel, “Aligning International Investment Agreements with the 
Sustainable Development Goals,” 58 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101, 124-130 (2019).
17 This is based on US GDP in 2018, USD 20.54 trillion. The award against Pakistan represented roughly 2 percent 
of its GDP.
18 Jarrod Hepburn, “Final Costs Details are Released in Philip Morris v. Australia Following Request by 




state prevails on the merits, tribunals commonly require them to bear (most of) those costs.20
Tribunals alone cost on average USD 933,000 per case.21 Again, even when the state wins, it is
commonly ordered by the tribunal to pay half of the arbitrators’ fees. 
This  exposure to  liability  and arbitration  costs  is  unjustified  for  both the  United  States  and
Kenya. In an era when governments must be particularly careful in terms of how they spend their
public  resources,  and  concerns  about  inequality  heightened,  such  excessive  transfers  to
individual companies, law firms, and individual arbitrators are unsupportable.
B. Purported Benefits of ISDS to U.S. Interests and 
Objectives 
1. Impacts on investment flows and outcomes
The costs of ISDS, which subsidize the risk that U.S. firms incur in deciding to invest abroad
(without any requirements as to how such subsidized investment may or must impact the U.S.
economy or U.S. objectives), are clear and their benefits are less so. After more than ten years of
scholarly and practical inquiry, there is no strong evidence that trade and investment agreements
impact  investment  flows.  The  various  empirical  studies  examining  trends  in  foreign  direct
investment (FDI) flows establish no clear statistical relationship between signing a treaty and
receiving increased investment,22 or in a states’ ability to retain such investment.23 Similarly, a
survey of in-house counsel in large U.S. multinationals revealed that investment agreements do
not play a significant role in foreign investment decisions.24 Some of the largest cross-border
investment flows take place in the absence of treaties, including between the U.S. and China,
India, Brazil, and the United Kingdom.
While it is well-known that international investment – including FDI into the United States or by
U.S. outward investors – can produce wide-ranging benefits  (e.g.,  bringing jobs, technology,
know-how, and capital across borders), it is also well-known that those positive effects do not
always materialize.25 Research indicates that in certain contexts FDI can crowd-out domestic
20 Susan Frank, “Arbitration Costs: Myths and Realities in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2019) Oxford University 
Press.
21 Matthew Hodgson and Alistair Campbell, ‘Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited’ Allen 
& Overy (14 December 2017).
22 See, e.g., Axel Berger et al., “Do trade and investment agreements lead to more FDI? Accounting for key 
provisions inside the Black Box,” 10 International Economics and Economic Policy 247 (2013); Karl Sauvant and 
Lisa Sachs, eds., The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investments (New York: Oxford University Press 2009).
23 Maria Borga, Perla Ibarlucea Flores, Monika Sztajerowska, “Drivers of divestment decisions of multinational 
enterprises: A cross-country firm-level perspective” (OECD Working Papers on international Investment 2019/03) 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/5a376df4-en> (finding that “the overall effect of IIAs appears mixed and relatively small” 
and that “these types of provisions do not appear to have a significant impact on the divestment probability of firms 
located in 41 selected OECD countries and G20 economies studied”).
24 Jason Yackee, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from 
Alternative Evidence,” 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 397 (2010).
25 Critically, not all studies on investment flows are of the same quality. Lauge N. Poulsen discusses a number of 
them and their results in Lauge N. Poulsen, “The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political 
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firms,26 contribute to inequality,27 worsen problems of corruption,28 facilitate  tax evasion and
avoidance,29 and generate food insecurity.30 FDI may also exacerbate environmental challenges
and/or discourage environmental policymaking.31 Overall, depending on factors such as the type
of  investment,  motive  for  investing  overseas,  the  corporate  culture  of  the  investor,  and  the
institutional  and  regulatory  framework  of  the  home  and  host  countries,  FDI  can  result  in
economic,  environmental  and social  impacts  that  are  either  positive  or negative for the host
country and its citizens; and, when the outcomes are negative, the foreign origin of capital can
make it difficult to secure redress for harms caused.32 
Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence,” in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & 
Policy 2009-2010 (Oxford University Press, 2010) 539-574 (hereafter, Poulsen, “The Importance of BITs”). Most 
studies on the connection between investment treaties and investment flows have looked specifically at whether the 
conclusion of such treaties had an impact on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) (as opposed to other types of 
international investment). As has been remarked by several scholars, these types of studies are problematic for a 
number of reasons, including that data on FDI flows is often inaccurate or inadequately disaggregated, and that, 
even if one were to find correlation between investment treaties and FDI flows, it would be extremely difficult to 
establish that the treaties actually caused those investments. (See, e.g., Lauge N. Poulsen, “The Importance of BITs”;
Emma Aisbett, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus causation” in Karl 
P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford University Press 2009) 395; Jason W. Yackee, 
“Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and The Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs promote 
foreign direct investment?” 42 Law and Society Review 805 (2008)).
26 The literature on impacts is too voluminous to cite here. Nevertheless, some research highlighting challenges and 
complexities in terms of effects on the host country’s domestic industry include the following: Sarianna Lundan, 
Tilo Halaszovich and Fabienne Fortanier, “North-South FDI and Economic Growth in the Host Country: The 
Effects of Formal and Informal Institutional Distance” (Investment Conference, 2015) available at 
investmentconference.info/wp.../Lundan_North-South_FDI_and_economic_growth.pdf; Nigel Driffield and Dylan 
Hughes, “Foreign and Domestic Investment: Regional Development or Crowding Out?” 37 Regional Studies 277 
(2003); George Chen, Yao Yao and Julien Malizard, “Does FDI Crowd In or Crowd Out Private Domestic 
Investment in China? The Effect of Entry Mode,” 61 Economic Modelling 409 (2017). Some of the negative impacts
of FDI may be felt in the short term, with positive effects materializing over the longer term. See Jennifer W. 
Spencer, “The Impact of Multinational Enterprise Strategy on Indigenous Enterprises: Horizontal Spillovers and 
Crowding Out in Developing Countries,” 33 Academy of Management Review 341 (2008).
27 Florence Jaumotte, Subir Lall and Chris Papageorgiou, “Rising Income Inequality: Technology or Trade and 
Financial Globalization?” (2008) IMF Working Papers 08/185.
28 See, e.g., Hassen A. Wako, FDI, Institutions, Economic Growth and Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Vienna Investment Conference, 2016).
29 See, e.g., Sung Jin Park, et al., “Is Foreign Direct Investment Effective from the Perspective of Tax Avoidance? 
An Analysis of Tax Avoidance Through the International Transfer Pricing Behaviors of Korean Corporations,” 32 
The Journal of Applied Business Research 917 (2016).
30 Andreea Michalache-O’Keef and Quan Li, “Modernization vs. Dependency Revisited: Effects of FDI on Food 
Security in Less Developed Countries,” 55 International Studies Quarterly 71 (2011); Mehdi Ben Slimane, 
Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon, Habib Zitouna, “The role of sectoral FDI in promoting agricultural production and 
improving food security,” 145 International Economics 50 (2015).
31 See, among others, Matthew Cole and Per Fredricksson, “Institutionalized Pollution Havens,” 68 Ecological 
Economics 1239 (2008); Matthew Cole, Robert Elliott and Per. Fredriksson, “Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does 
FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?” 108 Scand. J. of Economics 157 (2006); Kozluk and Timiliotis, “Do 
Environmental Policies Affect Global Value Chains?” (n 26); Yuquing Xing and Charles D. Kolstad, “Do Lax 
Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?” 21 Environmental and Resource Economics 1 (2002).
32 On this point, see, for example, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guide to Implementing 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in Investment Policymaking (The Laboratory for 
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Even  less  certain  than  outcomes  for  host  countries  is  the  extent  to  which  this  type  of
unconditional, subsidized risk insurance provided for through investment protections and ISDS
benefits home countries. What benefits does the U.S. receive as a result of supporting outward
investment through investment treaties and ISDS? While outward investment can improve the
competitiveness of U.S. firms and result in increased capital income and tax revenues in the U.S.,
it can also result in outsourcing of jobs and tax structuring to decrease tax liabilities, and a race
to the bottom in terms of labor or environmental protections or tax treatment to try to retain
investment in the U.S. 
Other U.S. initiatives to support outward investment into Kenya and other developing countries
in Africa and elsewhere recognize these complexities related to the drivers of FDI, outcomes
from FDI in home and host countries, and the advantages and disadvantages of different policy
interventions  for  shaping  investment  flows  and  effects.  The  U.S.  Development  Finance
Corporation (DFC), which provides U.S.-supported financial products, technical assistance, and
political risk insurance to qualifying U.S. outward investors, has developed policies and tools to
help ensure that it supports sustainable development in developing countries, does not cause of
loss of domestic jobs in the U.S., minimizes expenditure of U.S. tax revenue, and avoids creating
moral hazard.33 
Given both the uncertain relationship between
 ISDS and investment flows, and 
 investment flows and investment outcomes,
it is therefore critically important to move away from the blunt weapon of ISDS and seize this
opportunity to design an investment agreement that is smart in the types of investment it seeks to
promote, thoughtful in terms of the outcomes it seeks to achieve, and strategic in how it seeks to
advance its aims. These criteria could be advanced through innovations in the text as well as
institutions created by the agreement to support the treaty’s effective implementation.34 
2. Impacts on domestic rule of law
In addition to promoting investment, ISDS has often been cited as a tool that can be used to 
improve the rule of law and good governance in treaty parties by holding governments 
Advanced Research on the Global Economy and LSE Human Rights, 2016) 18; OHCHR, Progress Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Legal Options and Practical Measures To Improve Access
to Remedy for Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuses, UN doc A/HRC/29/39 (May 7, 2015), available 
at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Pages/ListReports.aspx.
33 U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Eligibility Checklist <https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer-
eligibility/eligibility-checklist> (accessed April 24, 2020). These policies were developed by the DFC’s predecessor,
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Nathan Lobel, “Aligning 
International Investment Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals,” 58 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 101, 116-122 (2019). 
34 Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Nathan Lobel, “Aligning International Investment Agreements with the Sustainable
Development Goals,” 58 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101, 122-124 (2019) (suggesting approaches that 
could be taken). 
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accountable for abuses of authority.35 Yet, while theoretically plausible, evidence of these effects
remains lacking.36 
Instead, studies examining the issue have found that BITs and ISDS claims may negatively affect
investment governance and the rule of law.37 One possible reason for this outcome is that ISDS 
may reduce governments’ incentives to improve their domestic governance. To the extent that 
ISDS reduces risks for investors to invest overseas in jurisdictions with little respect for the rule 
of law, governments may not face pressures to improve their investment climate and ensure that 
there are rules and systems in place enabling constituents, generally, to hold the government to 
account. 
A second reason why ISDS may negatively affect the rule of law and good governance at the 
domestic level is that it only amplifies the voice and interests of covered investors, potentially at 
the expense of other stakeholders.38 It provides covered investors access to privileged and 
powerful protections and legal mechanisms to challenge state conduct that negatively impacts the
rights or expectations of their investments. These enhanced protections and powers, in turn, 
threaten core aspects of the rule of law including principles of equality before the law, and 
efforts to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making.39
III. An Investment Chapter in a U.S.-Kenya 
Agreement can be an opportunity to advance U.S. 
and Kenyan objectives 
The U.S. and Kenya should take this opportunity to build on progress made with the USMCA
and to design investment provisions that: (1) promote and channel investments that contribute to
development objectives within both treaty-parties, and withhold benefits from investments that
do not achieve, or undermine, these goals, (2) foster responsible governance at the national level
and  (3)  promote  international  cooperation  to  overcome  transnational  and  collective  action
challenges, which will improve investment governance for both treaty parties. 
35 See,  e.g.,  Stephan Schill,  Fair and Equitable Treatment,  the Rule of  Law,  and Comparative Public Law,  in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan Schill ed., 2010).
36 See Joachim Pohl,  "Societal  benefits  and costs  of  International  Investment  Agreements: A critical  review of
aspects and available empirical evidence" at 55-69 (2018) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No.
2018/01 <https://doi.org/10.1787/e5f85c3d-en>. 
37 See, e.g., MAVLUDA SATTOROVA, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY LAW ON HOST SATES: ENABLING GOOD
GOVERNANCE (2018); see also, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova & Karen Dawisha, The Escape from Institution-Building in a
Globalized World: Lessons from Russia, 15  PERSP.  ON POL. 361 (2017)  (discussing international arbitration, not
limited to treaty-based arbitration).
38 Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, “Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Inequality: How 




A. Protecting Investors and Investments that Advance 
Treaty-Party Objectives
A  U.S.-Kenya  agreement  could  be  an  opportunity  to  promote  and  advance  the  kinds  of
investment that lead to sustainable economic development in both treaty parties. In order to do so
certain  investment  provisions should be refined,  when compared to  existing U.S. treaties,  to
ensure that treaty-based advantages are granted to investors meeting these criteria, and withheld
from those that do not. 
For example, definitions of “investor” and “investment” could be more closely aligned with the
approach taken by the U.S. DFC, which provides an extensive list of eligibility requirements for
U.S. outward investors to benefit from the government’s backing and support. These include
equity  requirements,  the  “track-record”  of  the  investor,  compliance  with  environmental  and
social  policies  and procedures throughout  the life  of the project,  and ensuring that  investors
actually contribute to sustainable development (measured by growth, innovation and inclusion
factors) based on scores of a performance measurement tool.40 
1. Promoting Economic Linkages with the Local Economy
Local content policies include those that govern investors and investments that aim to actively
embed  foreign  investment  in,  and  cause  spillovers  into  and  linkages  with,  the  domestic
economy.41 They can include: (1) basic local content requirements (e.g. measures that require or
encourage  investors/investments  to  use  a  certain  amount  or  proportion  of  local  resources
(including labor, services, materials and parts) when producing goods or providing services; (2)
export  restraints:  measures  such  as  quantitative  restrictions,  export  taxes,  licenses,  or  other
restraints used to require or encourage domestic value-addition; (3) joint venture requirements:
measures requiring foreign investors to partner with domestic  firms or other  entities  such as
research institutions; (4) local management requirements: measures requiring nationals to be on
boards or in senior management; (5) local equity requirements: measures that require firms to
have  a  certain  share  of  domestic  ownership;  (6)  location  requirements:  measures  requiring
companies  to  locate  their  global  or  regional  headquarters  in  the  host  state,  or  to  establish
operations in a particular location in the host state; and (7) technology transfer requirements.
When designed and implemented well, performance requirements can be used combat market
failures and leverage FDI to maximize potential  but otherwise unrealized benefits  from FDI;
some  investment  treaties,  including  ones  concluded  by  the  US  in  the  past,  however,  have
imposed broad and blanket  bans  on  such measures.  Rather  than  crafting  investment  treaties
anticipatorily strip governments’ policy toolboxes, another approach would be to permit these
measures  while  providing  platforms  for  engagement  and  continued  learning  rearding  their
40 U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Eligibility Checklist <https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer-
eligibility/eligibility-checklist> (accessed April 24, 2020).
41 For a discussion of the points raised in this section see Lise Johnson, “Space for Local Content Policies and 
Strategies: A crucial time to revisit an old debate” (July 2016) 
<https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8V40VRC.
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advantages and disadvantages in different contexts, for different stakeholders, and for different
policy objectives. 
B. Foster Responsible Governance at the National Level: 
Sustainability Impact Assessments
 
Given the intent for a U.S.-Kenya agreement to effect changes in investment flows and practices,
the U.S. and Kenya should assess the projected environmental,  social,  economic,  and human
rights impacts of the investment agreement and the FDI that it is supporting. It will be important
to assess impacts not only before negotiating and concluding the agreement, but also how any
impacts may develop throughout the life of the agreement such that appropriate policy responses
can be developed and implemented. 
Such an impact assessment could also map legal gaps between the U.S. and Kenya both on the
books and as  enforced.  U.S.  trade  and investment  agreements  have  historically  incorporated
state-state cooperation in relevant sectors and issue areas to attempt to address any gaps that are
found. However studies, including government audits, have found that these provisions are not
always effective, or as effective as they could be. 
C. Promote International Cooperation to Overcome 
Transnational and Collective Action Challenges
1. Overcoming Barriers to Lasting Investment: Opportunities
for Exchange and Ombuds Offices
Barriers  to  investment  are  multi-faceted  and  may  result  from:  explicit  public  policies  (e.g.
restrictions on investment in physical locations or sectors; tax treatment); softer barriers (e.g.
legal,  economic,  or  political  uncertainty);  information  asymmetries;  linguistic  differences;
geographical distances; and geographical features, among other factors.
Addressing these issues can be done unilaterally,  but  in  many cases states  can benefit  from
cooperation  with  other  states.  Such  bilateral  work  may,  for  example,  be  facilitated  through
political  dialogues  and exchanges  among private  sector,  government,  civil  society  and other
relevant actors. They can also be advanced through more institutional mechanisms, such as a
treaty-based ombuds office that can help to address investment issues that may arise between the
parties or with respect to specific investors or groups of investors. Various states have begun to
implement treaty-based or more general investment ombuds or similar offices in order to address
hurdles  and  problems  surrounding  investment  projects  or  processes,  or  that  arise  after  an
investment project has been initiated but can threaten its survival.42 These mechanisms can be
used to address complaints by investors about conduct by governments, as well as complaints by
civil  society  organizations  about  conduct  of  governments  or  investors  related  to  investment
projects or policies.  
42 E.g. Brazil, South Korea, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Peru.
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Through such an ombuds office or otherwise, states can jointly pursue tools and agreements
related to risk mitigation and economic and political cooperation to attract and channel specific
types of FDI. These can focus on helping investors better identify cross-border opportunities;
raise concerns that allow policy-makers to understand and address investment impediments or
barriers; or facilitate or provide technical, financial or other treatment (including on a special and
differential treatment basis) to aid public investments in infrastructure that enable private sector
investment. Moreover, these tools can be used to 
2. Combatting Races to the Bottom and Protecting Jobs in 
U.S. States and Localities
As borders open, interjurisdictional competitions for capital can and do develop. This can, for
example,  put  pressure on  U.S.  states  and localities  to  offer  even more  generous investment
incentives to retain or attract investment. These incentives can create strains on state and local
budgets that are often not recouped from the benefits of the relevant investment for decades, or
ever.
Investment treaties serve to protect capital moving across borders and can thus exacerbate the
problems U.S. states and localities  face.  Prior to the USMCA, U.S. investment  chapters and
treaties  did  not  discriminate  between  sectors  of  investment.  The  USMCA  still  does  not
discriminate between the quality of investment. These treaties are blunt instruments that could be
refined in a U.S.-Kenya agreement in order to better protect U.S. states and localities from races
to the bottom. 
U.S. trade and investment agreements include provisions restricting certain types of regulatory
incentives in order to prevent governments from engaging in races to the bottom in, for example,
labor or environmental standards.43 The USMCA also includes provisions that prohibit treaty-
parties from failing to enforce anti-corruption laws as encouragement for trade and investment,
and explicit  requirements  that  Mexico strengthen protections  for  freedom of  association  and
collective bargaining in its labor laws,44 and also limit preferential treatment in the auto industry
to cars built by workers making a specified wage.45 
43 Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, International Investment Agreements, 2013: A Review of Trends and New 
Approaches, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2012-2013, 25, 39-41 
(Andrea Bjorklund, ed., 2015). Due to a large stock of older and long-lived international investment agreements 
(IIAs), only a minority of all IIAs in force contain such labor, human rights, or environmental provisions. Kathryn 
Gordon, Joachim Pohl & Marie Bouchard, Investment Law Sustainable Development and Responsible Business 
Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey 5 (OECD Working Papers 2014/1, 2014).
44 USMCA, Annex 23-A.
45 Id. Annex 4-B.
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While  these  types  of  provisions  have  rarely  been  enforced,46 the  USMCA  is  an  important
precedent upon which the U.S. and Kenya could build. An agreement could work to advance and
strengthen protections in a wider range of sectors and issues (including by limiting definition of
covered  investor  and  investments  discussed  above).  It  could  also  advance  climate  change
mitigation  and  adaptation  by  imposing  affirmative  obligations  to  cooperation  on  identifying
opportunities for investment in clean technologies; provide, on a special and differential basis,
support  for  qualifying  projects;  or  mandate  corporate  disclosures  of  GHGs  in  exchange  for
certain  benefits  or  preferences.  This  kind  of  cooperation  can  also  help  the  U.S.  to  meet  its
objectives regarding technology transfer contained in the United Nations Framework Convention
for  Climate  Change  and  the  Agreement  on  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property
Rights.47 
IV. Conclusion
The U.S. and its strategic partner, Kenya, have much to gain through a mutually advantageous 
trade agreement. In order to do so, it will be critical that the U.S. and Kenya embrace the 
opportunity to advance a vision of trade and investment that builds upon developments made in 
recent U.S. agreements, particularly with respect to any investment provisions or chapter. First 
and foremost, ISDS is an antiquated and controversial mechanism that is ill-suited to the U.S.’s 
investment objectives. Any investment provisions contained in a U.S.-Kenya agreement should 
align with a principled approach that (1) promotes and channels investments that contribute to 
development objectives within both treaty-parties, and withhold benefits from investments that 
do not achieve, or undermine, these goals, (2) fosters responsible governance at the national level
and (3) promotes international cooperation to overcome transnational and collective action 
challenges, which will improve investment governance for both treaty parties. Such an 
agreement would be a worthwhile model to advance U.S., and indeed global, investment and 
development opportunities.
46 Even when private parties raise allegations of breach through treaty-based complaint mechanisms, the treaty-
parties have almost always declined to engage in formal dispute settlement. Only one labor complaint of the more 
than 40 raised under NAFTA’s labor side agreement and other U.S. trade agreement has reached the dispute 
settlement phase. Franz Christian Ebert & Pedro A. Villarreal, The Renegotiated “NAFTA”: What Is In It for Labor 
Rights? (EJIL: Talk! October 11, 2018).
47 Article 66.2 TRIPS.
13
ANNEX A: 
IF ANY FORM OF ISDS IS RETAINED IN A U.S.-KENYA AGREEMENT,
IMPROVEMENTS MUST BE MADE
While  the  U.S.-Mexico  relationship  in  the  USMCA made  improvements  on  the  investment
protections  and ISDS mechanism contained  in  earlier  U.S.  trade  and investment  agreements
detailed  above,  there  is  scope  for  additional  improvements  to  the  extent  any form of  ISDS
provision is retained in a U.S.-Kenya agreement. 
Recognizing and safeguarding the rights and interests of non-parties
Disputes between two litigating parties often impact the rights and interests of those not party to
the litigation or arbitration. Non-party interests and rights may arise, and have arisen, in ISDS on
the  basis  of  a  variety  of  relationships,  including:  creditors  of  ISDS  claimants;48 municipal
jurisdictions with interests in land or contracts that are at issue in ISDS cases;49 communities
impacted  by  the  investment  (particularly  those  contesting  the  investment  via  domestic
processes);50 individuals with competing claims to property in interest;51 and adverse parties in
domestic  litigation;52 among  others.  The  rights  and  interests  of  these  non-parties  may  be
triggered in different ways, including: where underlying issues are being heard in different fora
(one of which is  ISDS);53 when investors challenge  domestic  court  processes  or  outcomes;54
disputes seeking interim or injunctive relief;55 among others.
The arbitration rules that are provided for in U.S. trade and investment agreements, including in
the USMCA, contain no protections  for interested and affected non-parties,  even though the
litigation positions adopted in and outcomes of ISDS disputes frequently impact the rights and
interests of other natural and legal persons.56 Under U.S. investment agreements, the only avenue
48 Dan Cake S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9 (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 2015)
49 Mr. Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/13 (Award, 2015).
50 Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2 (Award, 2016; Joint Motion for Stay 
of the Pending Completion of Settlement Agreement, 2018).
51 Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25.
52 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (Final Award, 
2017); Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23.
53 TransCanada Corporation and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. The United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB/16/21 (Order of the Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, 2017); Copper 
Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2 (Award, 2016; Joint Motion for Stay of the 
Pending Completion of Settlement Agreement, 2018).
54 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (Final Award, 
2017); Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23.
55 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2009-23; Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development 
Co. (Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25.
56 See e.g. CCSI, IIED, and IISD, “Third-Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform” 
(Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform, 15 Juy 2019) 
for third-parties to seek to provide input into an ISDS proceeding is as amicus curiae, which is
not  intended to address the rights or interests  of the  amicus,  but  to assist  the tribunal  in its
determination of the rights of the parties to the dispute.  Moreover,  among other deficiencies
associated with the  amicus  mechanism, the tribunal has the discretion to determine whether to
accept applications to provide input as amicus.57
Of course, third parties are impacted by proceedings in U.S. domestic courts. As in U.S. treaty
practice, U.S. federal and state courts grant participation of amici to assist courts in their work.
However,  in stark contrast  to the approach under treaties,  those U.S. courts also provide for
relatively broad standards of intervention of third parties in certain contexts where the rights of
those parties are  at  stake or stand to  be affected by the outcome of a proceeding.  The U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1) provide a mechanism for mandatory or permissive joinder
by interested or affected non-parties, and (2) require dismissal of cases when a non-party’s rights
will be affected by the dispute resolution proceedings but the non-party cannot join those cases.58
We thus urge the U.S. to address this issue within a U.S.-Kenya agreement (and subsequent U.S.
treaties)  to ensure fairness to  non-parties.  Specifically,  there should at  a minimum be a rule
mandating dismissal of claims or cases in which (1) the rights or interests of non-parties will be
affected by the arbitration, and (2) those non-parties are not willing or able to join the arbitration
as parties.59
Transparency of ISDS Disputes, Mediation, and Other Settlements
Article  29  of  the  2012  U.S.  Model  Bilateral  Investment  Treaty,  and  Article  14.D.8  of  the
USMCA, facilitate  the public’s ability  to access filings and to view hearings.  We agree that
public access to all information related to contract and treaty-based ISDS disputes, particularly to
information that may impact the rights and interests of non-parties to the dispute, is critically
important  in  the  context  of  democratic  accountability  and  good  governance.  We  take  this
opportunity to urge the U.S. to exercise its leadership in arbitral transparency by ratifying and
acceding to the Mauritius Convention on Transparency.60
We note that, in strong contrast to the transparency afforded arbitration processes and awards
under  U.S.  treaties,  the  U.S.  does  address  transparency  surrounding  the  settlement  of  ISDS
disputes, including settlement agreements arising out of mediation or other alternative dispute
resolution. While settlements between parties can be positive outcomes, saving parties time and
expenses, and potentially doing much to retain FDI in the host-country, when a government is a
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2019/07/uncitral-submission-third-party-participation-en.pdf (describing the ways in 
which third-party rights are impacted by ISDS disputes and possible reform options).
57For a discussion of the natural and limitations of the amicus curiae mechanism, see id. at pp. 5-6.  
58 US Fed. R. Civ. Proc. R. 19(a) & (b).
59 See e.g. CCSI, IIED, and IISD, “Third-Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform” 
(Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform, 15 July 2019). 
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2019/07/uncitral-submission-third-party-participation-en.pdf
60 United States Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Oct. 18, 2017 < 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-3&chapter=22&clang=_en>.
1
party to such a settlement they can raise threats to democratic accountability, good governance,
and the rule of law.61 
As has been recognized by courts and commentators in the context of U.S. domestic litigation,
giving the government such broad powers to unilaterally determine what arguments to make and
what settlements to adopt can significantly - and negatively - impact the rights and interests of
non-parties to the litigation.62 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has highlighted the “sue and
settle” problem that arises when governments settle,  rather than publicly defend, lawsuits  by
private  parties.63 By  entering  into  settlements,  the  U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce  states,  a
government  agency commits  itself  to  “legally  binding,  court-approved settlements  negotiated
behind closed doors, with no participation by other affected parties or the public,” which allows
agencies  to  avoid  the  legislatively  established  norms  governing  the  rulemaking  process,
frustrating the separation of powers and distorting the priorities and duties of the agency in favor
of private outside groups.64 
As such, in the U.S., various rules and mechanisms exist for public and judicial oversight of
settlement agreements, including:
● Statutory requirements that apply prior to the formation of a settlement agreement, such
as  rules  requiring  the government  to  give  the public  notice of and an opportunity  to
comment on proposed agreements;
● Rules permitting or giving non-parties the right to intervene in disputes and comment on
or object to settlements;65
● Requirements for judicial approval of certain proposed agreements;66
● Doctrines preventing enforcement of settlement agreements that violate the law.
Existing U.S. treaties and U.S. law do not provide similar rules aimed at protecting non-party
rights and interests in the context of proposed settlements, or mechanisms for ensuring public
oversight  of  proposed  settlement  agreements.  Additionally,  to  the  extent  decisions  to  settle
involve counterclaims, concerns about settlement are magnified as the rights and interests  of
non-parties, and how such rights, interests, or potential claims, may be disposed of in the context
of a settlement, remain unaddressed and unclear. We urge the U.S. to address these gaps in the
context of a U.S.-Kenya agreement and, as applicable, in U.S. domestic law.
61 Lise Johnson & Brooke Guven, “The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of Democratic 
Accountability and the Public Interest,” Investment Treaty News (March 13, 2017) available at https://www.iisd.org/
itn/2017/03/13/the-settlement-of-investment-disputes-a-discussion-of-democratic-accountability-and-the-public-
interest-lise-johnson-and-brooke-skartvedt-guven/; Brooke Guven, “Investor-State Mediation: An Opportunity to 
Advance Sustainable Outcomes,” CCSI Blog (Jan. 30, 2020) available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2020/01/03/investor-state-mediation-an-opportunity-to-advance-sustainable-outcomes/.
62 See generally, Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The problems with 
consent decrees in government-defendant cases, 16 Journal of Constitutional Law 637, 647–649 (2014).
63 U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (2013, May). Sue and settle: Regulating behind closed doors, p. 3. Retrieved from 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf. See also 
https://www.uschamber.com/report/sue-and-settle-regulating-behind-closed-doors.
64 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Sue and settle, id. at 3.
65 See, e.g., at the federal level, U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 24(a) and 24(b).
66 See, e.g., 42 USCS § 9622; United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir., 1991).
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Transparency of corporate structure and beneficial ownership 
The  tax  planning,  regulatory  arbitrage,  and  treaty  structuring  strategies  of  multinational
corporations  often result  in  complex and non-transparent  ownership structures.  The pleading
standards  contained  in  U.S.  investment  treaties  are  limited  to  the  name  and  address  of  the
claimant and, if a claim is submitted on behalf of an enterprise, the name, address, and place of
incorporation of the enterprise.67 Rather than requiring the U.S. and Kenya to embark upon costly
and wasteful efforts to disentangle corporate ownership structures with each claim, we urge the
U.S. to include within its treaties requirements for claimants to fully disclose corporate family
structures  and  beneficial  owners.  In  addition  to  helping  reduce  the  time  and  expense  of
arbitration by clarifying certain issues at the outset of the dispute, such a rule on early disclosure
would also likely reduce incentives for companies to abuse the flexibilities afforded by corporate
law, and would enable other interested and potentially affected individuals and entities such as
creditors and shareholders to be aware of the case.
Third-Party Funding
Third-party funding in ISDS is a largely unregulated practice in ISDS that is now part of the
multilateral reform efforts within UNCITRAL’s WGIII. A wide variety of policy issues, many
unique to the ISDS context, may arise when third-party funders are introduced into these cases,
including impacts on: (1) investor decisions and conduct (including the number of cases, the
nature and motives to bring cases, and decisions to remain invested or to divest); (2) the law and
outcomes of claims (including the quality of claims, the substantive development of the law,
decisions  to  settle  claims);  and  (3)  respondent  states  and  their  governance  of  investment
(including  regulatory  chill  and  overdeterrence  and concentrated  impacts  on  certain  types  of
investment and respondent states).68 Because the practice remains largely non-transparent, it is
difficult to obtain and assess empirical data on its impacts. In this light, precautionary regulation
may  be  advised,  particularly  when  considering  how the  U.S.  treats  the  issue  of  third-party
funding in comparable contexts. 
As a general matter, U.S. states, along with other common law jurisdictions, historically applied
doctrines  prohibiting  maintenance  (the  support  of  a  third  party’s  litigation)  and  champerty
(supporting litigation in exchange for a share in the proceeds of the claim).  While  the strict
application of these doctrines has been relaxed in many U.S. jurisdictions, this is not to say that
third-party  funding  in  domestic  litigation  is  now  unregulated.  For  example,  various  states
prohibit funders from controlling the management of claims. 
However,  the  ways  in  which  third-party  funders  and  funding  are  treated  generally  in  U.S.
jurisdictions is not the correct inquiry. Rather, the question that is relevant to the ISDS context,
where the U.S. federal government is the respondent in any claim, should be how the issue of
third-party funding is treated in claims against the U.S. federal government.
67 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Ch.14.D.3(2)(a).
68 Brooke Guven & Lise Johnson, “The Policy Implications of Third-Party Funding in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement” (May 2019) CCSI Working Paper 2019 < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/11/The-Policy-
Implications-of-Third-Party-Funding-in-Investor-State-Disptue-Settlement-FINAL.pdf>.
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The U.S. Anti-Assignment of Claims Act prohibits “a transfer or assignment of any part of a
claim  against  the  United  States  Government  or  of  an  interest  in  a  claim,”  as  well  as
“authorization to receive payment for any part of the claim.”69 There are exceptions, such as
permitting interest in claims to be transferred  after they have been determined to be valid and
after the amount owed has been decided.
The Anti-Assignment Act aims to serve several policy objectives:
first,  to  prevent  persons  of  influence  from  buying  up  claims  which  might  then  be
improperly  urged  upon  Government  officials;  second,  to  prevent  possible  multiple
payment of claims and avoid the necessity of the investigation of alleged assignments by
permitting the Government to deal only with the original claimant; and third, to preserve
for the Government defenses and counterclaims which might not be available against an
assignee.70
While the Anti-Assignment Act applies broadly across various causes of action,  including to
prohibit voluntary assignments of indirect takings claims and tort claims, it would not not control
treaty-based arbitration tribunals or prevent them from permitting investors to assign their ISDS
claims to third-party funders. Funders could thus invest in a single claim, or a portfolio of claims,
against the U.S. federal government and no regulations (including with respect to transparency,
control  of  the  claim,  costs  and  security  for  costs,  or  conflicts-of-interest  standards)  on  the
practice would clearly apply to the funder or its investment in the claim(s) (in direct contrast to
rules that apply to claims by domestic claimants against the U.S. in U.S. courts). The U.S. should
take  this  opportunity  to  consider  how  this  currently  permissive  approach  aligns  with  U.S.
objectives, as well as U.S. law and policy, and use this opportunity to address any shortcomings
or misalignment. 
Preventing Abuse of Interim Measures
In a growing number of cases, investor/claimants in investor-state disputes are seeking interim
measures  of  injunctive  relief  that  aim  to  compel  states  to  halt  their  own  governmental
investigations of or claims against the investor relating to the investor’s alleged wrongdoing.71 In
other cases, requests for interim measures of injunctive relief ask for an order compelling the
state to halt litigation brought by private parties against the investor, or to stop private parties
from collecting sums awarded against the investor through separate legal proceedings.72
69 31 USC § 3727.
70 Kingsbury v. United States [1977] 563 F.2d 1019, 1024.
71 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Analysis: Arbitrators Revoke an Interim Measures Decision, But Continue to Offer 
Little Explanation for How ‘Procedural Integrity of Arbitration’ Was in Peril, IA Reporter (Oct. 18, 2016); Joel 
Dahlquist, Interim Tax-Related Measures Revealed to Have Been Ordered by Full ICC Tribunal – Constituted on an
Expedited Basis – and Later Vacated, IA Reporter (March 21, 2016).
72 Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment & United Nations Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, “Impacts of the International Investment Regime on 
Access to Justice: Roundtable Outcome Document” (Sept. 2018) < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/09/CCSI-and-
UNWGBHR-International-Investment-Regime-and-Access-to-Justice-Outcome-Document-Final.pdf
>; see e.g. Luke Eric Peterson, “ICSID Tribunal Orders State-Owned Companies to Work to Get Local Court 
Injunction Lifted,” IAReporter (July 20, 2016); Luke Eric Peterson, “In ‘Show Cause’ Proceeding, Chevron 
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These types of requests can potentially interfere with legitimate government and private actions
to  hold  investors  accountable  for  harms  they  cause  in  the  host  state.  Given  the  persistent
challenges that many host countries and communities face in terms of securing relief for injuries
caused  by  projects  involving  foreign  investment,73 giving  investors  these  added  tools  for
avoiding responsibility is particularly problematic.
We urge the U.S., in the U.S.-Kenya context, to seek to prevent investors from abusing requests
for interim measures through, for example, bans on such requests or rules requiring imposition of
financial penalties on investors who seek to shut down any non-frivolous case or investigation
against the investor.
Not Consenting in Advance, or Including Filters to ISDS 
There are other procedural mechanisms that can be used to ensure that the U.S. and Kenya retain
more control over the ISDS claims that they wish to permit under their treaty, including: (1)
state-state filters; and (2) not providing advance content to claims.
The 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides for state-state filters to ensure that only certain tax-related
claims may proceed. These kinds of filters help to ensure that treaty-parties have ongoing control
over  the  management  of  their  treaties  in  ensuring  that  claims  falling  within  the  scope  of
protection are advanced and clear outliers cannot bring opportunistic or abusive claims under the
auspices of the treaty. This model could be more broadly employed to a wider range of sectors
(such as those touching upon critical environmental or social issues) or indeed, to all claims.
U.S. treaties  include advance consent  to  investor-state  arbitration  claims  advanced under the
treaty.  The U.S.  and Kenya could provide  that  treaty-parties,  like  investors,  may consent  to
arbitrate but need not do so in advance of a factual situation that may result in a claim.
Quantifies Alleged Losses Due to Ecuador’s Failure to Block Enforcement of Lago Agrio Judgment,” IAReporter 
(Nov. 19, 2013).
73 See, e.g., Guide to Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in Investment 
Policymaking (The Laboratory for Advanced Research on the Global Economy & the LSE Investment and Human 
Rights Project, 2016), at 18 (quoting OHCHR Report, UN doc A/HRC/29/39, para 25; Progress report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy
for victims of business-related human rights abuses (May 2014)).
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